The end of the Cold War is often considered a bit of a geopolitical anomaly. In 1980, the increasing antagonistic relations between the US and the Soviet Union caused many to fear the conflict was once again on the path to nuclear fallout. President Reagan famously characterized the Soviet Union as the, quote, "evil empire", while Soviet media described US foreign policy as nuclear insanity. I remember this personally because when I was growing up in Denmark, there would be practice sirens. Like every Wednesday we as kids, we had to hide under the desk in case the Soviets would attack. And the Cold War definitely defined much of my childhood. And it seemed like something that was intense and was here to stay. But then things quickly shifted and by the mid 80s, the two superpowers started cooperating. And and even more surprisingly, the Soviet Union collapsed by the end of the decade. And just like that, the Cold War ended. As as historian John Lewis Gaddis has observed, wars hot or cold do not normally end with the abrupt but peaceful collapse of a major antagonist. So what was the difference about the end of the Cold War? My guest today is Simon Miles, an assistant professor here at Duke University at the Sanford School of Public Policy. His recently released book is called Engaging the Evil Empire: Washington, Moscow and The Beginning of the End of the Cold War. In it Miles seeks to answer this question, among several others. The book focuses on the often overlooked period of the early 1980s. Was the shift in the relations as abrupt as it appeared? How can we understand the shift in the end of the Cold War, given the strategies of both superpowers? Simon, thank you for joining me.

Simon Miles [00:01:58] Thanks so much for having me.

Judith Kelley [00:02:00] So your book covers these tumultuous five years of the Cold War between 1980 and nineteen eighty five. So let's start in 1980. Can you paint a picture of the conflict in 1980 for our listeners?

Simon Miles [00:02:15] Absolutely. So in 1980, Ronald Reagan is on the campaign trail running against the incumbent, Jimmy Carter, and he is telling a story about America's situation in the Cold War and indeed at home, which is profoundly pessimistic. This is really at odds with our memory of Reagan, who's become sort of the avatar of American exceptionalism and can do optimism for better or for worse in our contemporary moment. But at the time, Reagan is a pessimist. He's telling the American people that not only is the situation at home dire, but he's also telling them the Soviet Union has pulled ahead in the Cold War competition.

Judith Kelley [00:02:59] Right.

Simon Miles [00:03:00] He focuses on a few issues here, which I just want to tease out. One is the global south, where the Soviet Union appears to be not just on the march, but perhaps winning the Cold War in Latin America, for example. And in the wake of the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which was launched in December nineteen seventy nine. But also when he looks at the balance of power between the two sides, the two blocks, I should emphasize, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Reagan is telling a story of American and Western deficit. The Soviet Union has attained strategic nuclear superiority, Soviet conventional forces in Europe are menacing European countries friendly to the United States, including but not limited to Denmark. And the threat of of conflict is very real in the minds of Reagan's advisers. And it doesn't look good for the United States or its allies.
Judith Kelley [00:03:58] So was that I mean, you say that's the story he was telling. What was that sort of classic sort of campaign fear mongering, or was that pretty reflective of the actual reality in nineteen eighties?

Simon Miles [00:04:09] I think that's such an important question because it's easy to dispense with that as just another John F. Kennedy type of missile gap story.

Judith Kelley [00:04:18] Right.

Simon Miles [00:04:19] And so it's certainly true that there are individuals who amplified that story for political purposes in order to undercut Jimmy Carter. But here I would emphasize not the evidence that I bring to bear on Ronald Reagan, but rather the evidence that I have on the Soviet Union. And what's striking is that the Soviets reached a very, very similar conclusion. In 1980, they are talking and the Kremlin under Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary at the time, about the need for dialog with the United States as quickly as possible to move into a bargaining and negotiating phase in order to lock in their gains. So the Soviet Union is actually perceiving the same balance of power as Reagan is talking about on the campaign trail. And I want to emphasize the word perceiving here, because I think we know now that, in fact, the gap was much narrower, that systemic forces really favored the United States over the Soviet Union. But during the year 1980, as you asked about, that's the balance of the Cold War. It's one that actually is seen to favor Moscow over Washington.

Judith Kelley [00:05:28] And it wasn't just that Moscow realized that they actually didn't have as much of an advantage and they wanted to negotiate. I mean, if they truly believed they had an advantage, why not continue to advance?

Simon Miles [00:05:40] Because they recognized some real problems. And one of the key problems was the United States's technological advantage. So while they had a quantitative military edge in Europe, for example, qualitatively, they knew things didn't look good for them.

Judith Kelley [00:05:58] So when you say quantitative, Simon, do you mean manpower?

Simon Miles [00:06:01] I mean, in terms of. Yes, the quantity of forces there and the quantity of equipment. So you could write this whole story if you wanted, as a very kind of actuarial story about counting tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and things like that. In this book, I try to kind of background that and just tease out the big trends. But yes, the United States is kind of coming out of the Vietnam War, which had effectively caused it to skip a generation of military modernization. The Soviets know this and they know that when that catch up happens, it's going to be a problem for this. So in these early nineteen eighties years, they're saying, hey, we've got the edge right now over the Americans. We need to get Reagan to the bargaining table and they do indeed anticipate Reagan's reelection. And we need to lock in our gains because the balance very well might shift in the coming years..

Judith Kelley [00:06:58] So it really was sort of a let's quit while we're ahead.

Simon Miles [00:07:02] Yes, let's sit while we're ahead, perhaps.
Judith Kelley [00:07:04] I see. So anyhow, fast forward five years and the situation at least feels or is perceived to be very different for the Soviets. What had changed over those five years?

Simon Miles [00:07:17] Let me focus on two big shifts. OK, and those are first from a balance of power perceived to favor the Soviet Union to one favoring the United States. And that's a function of a lot of things. It's a function of the US economy which overcomes not only the turbulence of the 1970s, but also the pain of the early 1980s and the so-called Reagan recession, high interest rates. But those high interest rates flooded the United States with capital. And so while they weren't without their dislocations, they were ultimately a net benefit for the United States economically and one which would last long beyond Reagan's tenure. The US military has significantly refitted and introduced a doctrine which was called AirLand Battle. And we don't need to get too deep into what that means. It's effectively jargon for what we could call aerospace blitzkrieg. But it is something to which the Soviet Union doesn't really have an answer. And that scares Warsaw Pact military leaders who recognize that as such. By nineteen eighty three, they're saying we have no means of repulsing Western attack on our borders short of strategic nuclear war, a kind of civilization ending retaliation, if you will. I just wanted to add one more point, and that was the situation in NATO is also really critical here. The US led alliance is stabilized and affirmed in part by going through the trials and tribulations of the crisis over the stationing of US nuclear weapons in Western Europe, the so-called euro missiles crisis. As a result of that, and in particular the willingness of American allies to host these weapons on their territory, the alliance's solvency is reaffirmed at the same time as the Warsaw Pact is experiencing significant internal turbulence over issues like oil exports, basically gratis to Romania or East Germany's financial overtures to the People's Republic of China, which was to the Soviet Union, a pariah state.

Judith Kelley [00:09:30] So the United States had solidified its position with its allies and was upping its technological capability. A lot of our listeners might might think of Reagan and think of this time. And I think of Starwars.

Simon Miles [00:09:43] Yes.

Judith Kelley [00:09:43] What was that about? How does that figure into the story?

Simon Miles [00:09:46] Star Wars, the or the Strategic Defense Initiative, as it was in the typically sort of banal language of the Pentagon officially named, was a project which I think speaks to Reagan's genuine personal desire to rid the world of nuclear weapons and plan to do so in some pretty fantastical ways. It's a real who's who of kind of sci fi weaponry, space based lasers, rail guns, kind of all of these far over the horizon scientific efforts. And so it's very easy and many historians do, to sort of dismiss this and say, well, why on earth would the Soviet Union think this pie in the sky or laser in the sky idea would ever actually worry a Kremlin policymaker who knew that it was fantastical, to say the least, earning its sci fi moniker? And I think there are two really key points here that are important to stress. The first is not about Star Wars, but it's about what it said about American technological capabilities and the much more real advances, for example, in communications, information technology, in a military context on which it was built. And though space based lasers was a real stretch, technology like infrared based communication between infantry fighting vehicles was a real thing. And it was a real edge for the military situational awareness on the ground in Europe. That was not fantasy, but it was part of the whole Star Wars idea and that was very worrying to the Soviet Union. The other element here is the fact that according to many policymakers in Moscow, if the
United States initiated such a project, they would have no choice but to compete on that new front as well in order not to be outdone by Washington, that looked like dollar signs or rubal signs, I should say, and no one had any appetite, especially by the time that Mikhail Gorbachev comes into power in early nineteen eighty five to be spending more money on the military industrial complex, they need to spend money on consumer goods in order to deal with very, very real economic problems at home. And so when they looked at Star Wars on the most basic level, of course, it looks fantastical. In a practical sense, it also looks like a recipe for fighting nuclear war. If you combine it with a lot of the developments in American nuclear weapons technology, the MXICBM, the Trident D5 submarine launched ballistic missile, those look like weapons that decapitate. Right. That take out all of the nation's ability to retaliate, that break deterrence. Star Wars then mops up whatever is left. And so it's easy for a Soviet policymaker and many did to say this is a formula for launching a first strike nuclear war with impunity. And it speaks to their real capabilities in the real battlefield today. And the last thing we want is to fight this battle technologically, which is going to further drive us economically into the hole.

Judith Kelley [00:13:15] So, so and most it was perceived as an actual real threat, but at least it was perceived that as a narrative about American technological sophistication and ambition.

Simon Miles [00:13:27] Exactly. And thus it was a really valuable bargaining chip for the Reagan administration later on because so much of it was amorphous. I kind of like to liken it colloquially to a casino chip with just a little blank space at the dollar value area, because both sides could project their own value onto it. And thus it was really, really useful for Reagan later on because as leverage, it was very fungible and that benefited the United States.

Judith Kelley [00:13:59] But it also sounds like there's an important piece of the story there with the with the domestic economy and the need to keep some popular support and overspending on military in the Soviet Union to to stay competitive in a way that that they realized weren't sustainable.

Simon Miles [00:14:19] Absolutely. The Soviet economy was in really dire straits through the 1980s. That had always been the case. But I always like to stress that during the nineteen seventies, two things were really different. During the nineteen seventies, the the turbulence of the onset of globalization, which which hurt the United States didn't so much hurt a group of economies in the Warsaw Pact member states, which were effectively autarkic. They were cushioned or shielded from a lot of those global economic pains. And then secondly, during the nineteen eighties, as the price of oil is skyrocketing and Americans are lining up 30 deep just to fill their cars up with gas at the local petrol station, the Soviet Union as an oil exporter is thriving because oil is what's generating hard currency for Moscow and hard currency is what is enabling Moscow to overcome its technological deficits by buying or, to be fair, stealing technology and high tech implements from the West. So by the 1980s, when those disjunctures of global, of the process of globalization have abated but not completely receded and oil prices have tanked, Moscow is looking a lot worse. And this is the era of lineups, of shortages, and of real pain for Soviet citizens at home who are not able to get basic consumer goods. Meanwhile, enormous quantities of money are being spent on a military, which is saying to itself, we don't actually think this is going to do us any good. We're ultimately and almost immediately going to have to fall back on our nuclear strategic rocket forces.
Judith Kelley [00:16:08] So it sounds like many different things were coming to a head by nineteen eighty five. Simon, you were you spent years working on this book. I sort of have this image of you sitting deep in the archives with papers all around you and, you know, reading through various documents and stuff. Was there a moment when you were doing this research that you had some kind of, oh, my goodness, something that really surprised you, some document you read through and you were like, I cannot believe this.

Simon Miles [00:16:38] There were a few, but I could fill multiple podcasts on this because I love to talk about this aspect of the work, the archival work, which is the bedrock of this project. But let me just I'll just pick one. And so the scene is the East German Communist Party archives, which are in a Berlin suburb of Lichterfelde, which is quite charming. They're on a former military base, which was a US military base for the Cold War. And before that and actually it was built for Adolf Hitler's bodyguard unit. And thus it carries with it some of that nineteen thirties aesthetic, which particularly in Germany, sends a very clear message to people walking around there. So I'm in the microfiche room of the of the facility, which is not even a microfilm, which is the negatives on the big spool.

Judith Kelley [00:17:32] Right.

Simon Miles [00:17:32] But these are the tiny little plastic cards which have about three dozen pages.

Judith Kelley [00:17:37] Yeah.

Simon Miles [00:17:38] Which I believe were very (unintelligible) in kind of the nineteen seventies. But but for, for myself, I have never I had never at this point dealt with such thing. And after one of the many kind of archivists there showed me how to use it and the reading machine, which is definitely older than I am, I start getting through this, this file which I didn't really know what would be in it, but it had some interesting sounding keywords in the online database. And so I ordered it because. Because why not? And I come across what I come across is a series of memoranda of conversation. So a meeting to record, not a verbatim transcript, but the record of a meeting translated from Russian into German of a series of meetings between Arthur Burns, who is the US ambassador to West Germany and two Soviet ambassadors to East Germany. There's a transition in nineteen late nineteen eighty two. And at first I think that these are going to be very banal because the two would actually regularly meet in their positions as the title was Co Allied Military Governance of Berlin. And they talked about sort of mundane things like air corridors, quantities of train cars and the day to day operational questions of running an island of capitalism in the middle of East Germany in western Berlin. And then Arthur Burns starts talking and he says Ronald Reagan has sent me here to Berlin to use this as a back channel to keep Cold War tensions under control for top level communications between key policymakers in Washington and Moscow, and ultimately to think of ways to reduce the tensions between us. And this was a really, really big revelation for me, because I knew well, the Reagan who called the Soviet Union is an evil empire as you started our conversation with. Who built up the US military and this was a very different Reagan and all of these conversations over the course of nineteen eighty one. Eighty two. Eighty three. Eighty four, eighty five. Talk of a very different Ronald Reagan, one who wants to reach out to and work with the Soviet Union, but one who isn't yet willing to do so publicly.

Judith Kelley [00:20:07] Right.
Simon Miles [00:20:08] And that's become a real second theme of the whole book is Reagan's covert diplomacy with the United States. Now, I've never been able to find records of these meetings anywhere in the American archives. There are some references which are very oblique to them in some of Burns's own papers, some of which are actually at Duke's Rubenstein library and archives. But they don't make sense unless you know, that these meetings are happening. So that was a huge aha moment because this opened up a whole other avenue of exploration and that's now been built out into a significant part of what the book is.

Judith Kelley [00:20:49] That's that's fascinating. In the introduction of your book, you make the distinction between engagement and incorporation. What is the distinction in the context of the Cold War? Is what you were talking about here, Reagan engaging in some way, but not necessarily cooperating or can you elaborate a bit on what you mean by that?

Simon Miles [00:21:09] Absolutely. So, so engaging in the title, engaging the Evil Empire. I didn't choose only for its alliterative properties, though. They're very welcome as a title author. Now I use the word engagement, in fact, inspired by the writing of Carl von Clausewitz, who talks about engagements as being steps towards achieving an ultimate goal. And I also use the word engagement because it's a value neutral way of describing diplomacy and diplomatic activities. So when I think, for example, about US Soviet arms control, one way to tell that story is of cooperation of Washington and Moscow, recognizing that they own these vast arsenals of profoundly destructive tools and needing to get that under control. But another way to tell that story, and this is more the story that I tell, is them recognizing that arms control can benefit them both by reducing costs, but also possibly be turned to the benefit of just one side by getting an advantage and then cementing it, legalizing it, formalizing it over the other. And so when I talk about Reagan's use of diplomacy, I use the word engagement to indicate that this isn't just purely Reagan wanting to cooperate with the Soviet Union. That's a very common trope, one which I push back against in this book. This is a competitive effort. He's using diplomacy to cement American gains economically, militarily and diplomatically and politically through diplomatic solutions, but ones which he, as he intends, benefit the United States. The classic example of this is the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty signed in late nineteen eighty seven, which is easy to cast as a sterling example of East-West cooperation. But it's also a treaty which favors the United States enormously, extraordinarily. And that's how Reagan uses diplomacy during this time, whether it's in the back channel with with with Soviet leaders in Berlin or there's another one in Moscow and one in Madrid and one in Belgrade as well or at the summit.

Judith Kelley [00:23:31] Right. So as you were telling this story, Simon, I'm thinking that much of this narrative is different from how we've come to think about the end of the Cold War. And so that leads me to a quote you have in your book where you say, So much of the story of the Cold War is one of perception, reality and the varying and often vast distance between the two. Can you can you just dive into that quote a little bit more?

Simon Miles [00:23:59] Yeah, this is a major theme of the book. I mean, one of the key mechanisms which I which I view as explanatory here is the perceived balance of power. And I'll just kind of foot stomp the word perceived there, because in the early days, your first question, nineteen eighty, nineteen eighty one. The gulf between perception and reality is quite considerable and indeed it's very hard looking back at this time today to make sense of how anyone could have seen the Soviet Union as having the edge. Right. Because we know what happens a decade later, it collapses. In this book, I use perception as a way to, I think, really show the value of history, specifically history, to studying
phenomena like this, because it's through the documents that we can really get at how people perhaps lied to themselves, perhaps were lied to by their subordinates, or perhaps confounded reality with their own prejudices and preconceptions. And that's the story of the Cold War. To me, that's the story of its outbreak and the perceived threat by both parties of one another in the in the mid nineteen forties. That's the story of some of its most turbulent moments, the perceived danger of, for example, losing Vietnam to global communism in the mid nineteen sixties. And it's the story of the nineteen eighties in this book where it's the perceived balance of power, shaping and condition and how leaders in Moscow and Washington and I should emphasize amongst their allies too, decided to push towards, push drive their policy towards the others.

Judith Kelley [00:25:43] So Simon, one of the ways that you were able to uncover this distance between perception and reality was that you you included perspectives of allies to the superpowers in the book, which is pretty unusual. What was the importance of that as you were discovering your narrative?

Simon Miles [00:26:04] So there are two real ways in which I think this is important. One has to do with some of the more pragmatic elements of researching a book which is fairly contemporary, certainly by the standards of declassification regimes, and also has to do with issues about which most countries, for frankly very sensible reasons tend to clam up. And that is nuclear weapons. In Eastern Europe, in particular, countries which are now post communist states have made openness, transparency about their communist pasts, a big part of their reckoning with them. So whereas the archives in Moscow are actually wonderfully open and are a real joy to work in and extremely accessible, much more so than is commonly thought, no one can hold a candle to a country like Germany or the Czech Republic, where absolutely nothing, with the exception of a few very personal, sensitive issues, is classified. And thus, well, my Eastern European states, for example, are my actors and their driving policy, their shaping superpower behavior. They're advocating for certain courses of actions and have their own interests, right? They're also, in addition to being actors, they're also kind of my Greek chorus in that they are offering wonderful commentaries about what's going on, commentaries based on really rich, deep knowledge of what's happening in Moscow. And they're giving a sense of of how not just the party line or the official line is unfolding, but how it's perceived by those shaping it because of their knowledge networks, which which include not only Berlin or Prague or in this book, I also make use of a lot of Ukrainian archives in Kiev, but also their knowledge of what's happening in Moscow. So it's kind of a back door, if you will, into the Soviet side of the story. And I don't want to repeat this whole exercise just to say that the same is true of the United States and some of its allies, which are more aggressive about declassification, including Canada and the UK, France and West Germany, too.

Judith Kelley [00:28:18] So staying on this theme of of difference between perception and reality, what do you think is the biggest misperception that people have today still about the end of the Cold War?

Simon Miles [00:28:30] Well, the biggest misperception about the time period that I cover in the book is that it was this second Cold War and that's the common moniker applied to it, that it was a return to the most dangerous periods of the Cold War, perhaps second only to the Cuban missile crisis. And in the book, I try to illustrate that just like other periods of the Cold War, the two superpowers were talking, they were competing, they were understanding one another, but they were also pushing for that edge. And thus I try to I try to push back on the perspective of the nineteen eighties as being nothing but on the one hand, Ronald Reagan shouting epithets at the Soviet leadership. On the other hand,
Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko just effectively being too old, too crippled, too physically and mentally frail to do anything. Instead, I tried to show a really dynamic interplay between the two sides, even during these years, where that is certainly not how we perceive it today and certainly not how it was perceived at the time. But the point about the end of the Cold War, I think is really important, too. And the perception that I'm trying to push back on is that it just went away.

Judith Kelley [00:29:50] Right.

Simon Miles [00:29:50] The perception that the two powers simply recognize that they didn't want to do this anymore and thus that one of them had the good grace to collapse.

Judith Kelley [00:30:00] Somebody made a hole in the wall.

Simon Miles [00:30:01] Yes. And that's an important story. That's a really valuable story. It's not my story, but that's so important. The story is is more complicated than that. The story is one of this decade long shift and the perceived balance of power. And thus, rather than seeing the end of the Cold War in a very basic, triumphalist way, United States is strong and it crushes the Soviet Union or a sort of messianic way, Gorbachev transcends Cold War competition and doesn't play with it. I try to show how both actors viewed the process in the framework of competition, certainly not without some evolution over time. And how the end of the Cold War, rather than just as you quoted John Gatins going away, it's actually a process and one with much deeper historical roots.

Judith Kelley [00:30:54] So let's fast forward to the contemporary period. Russia, which is now the remnants of the Soviet Union, continues to play a strong role in our foreign policy, and certainly we've had Russia intertwined with our twenty sixteen election and continued concerns about how the president of the United States is relating to Russia, to Putin, et cetera. So what, from your perspective, can this research tell us about this contemporary relationship between the U.S. and Russia?

Simon Miles [00:31:34] In the conclusion to the book I try to bring us as close to the president is as you can within the confines of academic publishing timelines. And one of my last characters in the book is Vladimir Putin, who is standing in Dresden in East Germany trying to deter a crowd which wants to break into his KGB facility in Dresden in order to access the documentation on Soviet Soviet Union's role in East Germany, they've already broken into the East German Stasi. That's the Ministry for State Security, the secret police complex nearby. And he knows this. And he has a really important moment here where he calls for backup. He calls for support and none comes. None is coming and Moscow is silent. And this is as it would be, I think, for any human being in such circumstances, a formative experience for the man who's currently and probably for the lot of the near and fairly distant future will be Russia's president because he recognizes and this is his diagnosis, that Russia that the Soviet Union has a fatal disease and that's a paralysis of power. Now, by opening up our story about the end of the Cold War. What I'm trying to do is say to those who would take one of the contemporary narratives of American strength and Soviet weakness and who would then quote (unintelligible) and say, well, the weak suffer what they must to say that to those who are in key leadership roles in Russia today, the 1980s and especially the early 1980s, are not ancient history. That's their professional career. And thus, when they talk about wanting to rebuild Russian power, they're not talking about rebuilding the Soviet Union. And they certainly don't want to go back to communism. They want to go back to the prestige and power and influence of the Soviet Union, which they don't believe needed to go away when Soviet ideology fell
apart. And that is not a distant land in their thinking. That's their recent lived experience. That's something which they know between nineteen eighty and nineteen eighty five, their leaders were fighting against. They were fighting to stop Soviet decline in the face of, to a certain degree, American predation. And thus it's to that fairly recent past, very much alive in their thinking past. They want to go back.

Judith Kelley [00:34:15] Most poignant in recent case in point, perhaps being the Armenia, Azerbaijan Russian peace deal.

Simon Miles [00:34:25] Absolutely. You know, in the earlier Cold War, Andrei Gromyko, who was the Soviet foreign minister, said to one of his American interlocutors when asked, what are you trying to do here? Basically, when he was asked what Soviet goals were diplomatically, he said, our goal is to make sure that there is no global problem that you can solve. You the United States can solve without us that we will have a seat at any table anywhere. And that was very much the reality in Soviet thinking, even in the early 1980s.

Judith Kelley [00:35:02] Right.

Simon Miles [00:35:03] By the end of the 1980s and certainly by nineteen ninety one in the nineteen nineties, it's no longer true. We have to look no further than, for example, NATO's air war in Kosovo, which is done over the explicit protestations of Russia's first president, Boris Yeltsin. It's to that I would argue that Putin and his key, his key allies and partners want to return.

Judith Kelley [00:35:26] Simon, this has been fascinating. Thank you so much for your time. Simon Miles is an assistant professor in the Sanford School of Public Policy. He also teaches in the Duke University History Department, as well as the Eurasian and Slavic Studies Department. His new book is Engaging the Evil Empire: Washington, Moscow and The Beginning of the End of the Cold War. And it is available from Cornell University Press. Simon, thank you for joining me today.

Simon Miles [00:35:55] Thanks so much for having me.

Judith Kelley [00:35:57] I'm Judith Kelly, and we'll be back in a couple of weeks with another episode of Policy 360.